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Abstract. The exercise of monopsony power by broiler processing firms is plausible because 
production  occurs  within  localized  complexes,  which  limits  the  number  of  integrators  with 
whom  growers  can  contract.    In  addition,  growers  face  distinct  hold-up  risks  as  broiler 
production requires a substantial investment in specific assets and most production contracts do 
not involve long-term purchasing commitments by integrators. This paper provides an initial 
exploration  of  the  links  between  the  local  concentration  of  broiler  integrators  and  grower 
compensation under production contracts using data from the 2006 broiler version of USDA’s 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey.  Results of this preliminary study, which accounts 
for characteristics of the operation and specific features of the production contract, suggest a 
small but economically meaningful effect of concentration on grower concentration. Limitations 
of the current analysis and future possible model extensions are discussed.  
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Local Monopsony Power in the Market for Broilers? Evidence from a Farm Survey 
 
High and growing concentration in meatpacking has raised concerns that firms could 
exercise market power in input markets for livestock or in product markets for meat. Most 
empirical analyses have attempted to test for oligopsonistic behavior by beef and pork processing 
firms in the livestock procurement market (Marion and Geithman, 1995; Koontz Garcia and 
Hudson, 1993; Steigert, Azzam, and Brorsen, 1993; Muth and Wohlgenant, 1999; Quagraini, 
Unterschultz, Veeman and Jeffrey, 2003; Inoue and Vukina, 2006).  Some research has 
attempted to disentangle the gains in economic efficiency resulting from scale economies, from 
the potential negative consequences of increased market power (Azzam and Schroeter, 1995; 
Azzam, 1997; Morrison Paul, 2001).  
As with beef and pork processing, the broiler industry has become increasingly 
concentrated in recent years. In 2005, the industry’s four-firm concentration ratio based on the 
volume of production reached 54 (USDA/GIPSA).  However, nationwide concentration indexes 
likely understate concentration in procurement markets, which remain quite localized because of 
the high costs of shipping live poultry and animals.  
Unlike the cattle and hog markets, there have been relatively few studies of monopsony 
power in the market for broilers (Vukina and Leegomonchai, 2006).  Common tests of 
monopsony power are not feasible in the poultry sector because there is no market price paid for 
product – almost all procurement takes place under production contracts. Under production 
contracts, farmers are paid for their growing services, not for the commodity, and are often 
compensated based on their performance relative to other producers in a pool: pool members 
with higher feed efficiency and lower mortality earn higher fees (Knoeber, 1989). Procurement   3 
markets in broilers are not markets for live poultry, but instead are markets for growers’ services, 
and the market prices are the payments made to growers. 
Broiler production occurs within localized complexes operated by integrators. Complexes 
include one or more feed mills, slaughter plants, and further processing plants that are usually 
owned and operated by the integrator. A complex will also feature one or more hatchery 
operations as well as operations producing replacement birds for the hatcheries, which may be 
operated by the integrator or by farmers who contract with the integrator. Integrators then   
contract with nearby farmers to grow chicks to market weight, and provide them with chicks, 
feed, and veterinary services from their own facilities. Economies of scale in slaughter, 
hatcheries, and feed mills provide incentives to construct large facilities near the center of a 
production complex. Because transportation costs for feed, chicks, and birds are significant, 
grow-out costs can be reduced by locating them close to hatchery, slaughter, and feed facilities. 
There may also be some scale economies in grow-out. These pressures for geographic 
concentration are limited by negative effects associated with concentration of poultry litter, 
which can exacerbate pollution risks to water and air resources, and by the biosecurity risks that 
would arise with concentrating all grow-out with a few very large operations. 
The exercise of monopsony power by broiler processing firms is plausible because the 
localized nature of the production complex limits the number of integrators with whom a grower 
can contract. Moreover, growers face distinct hold-up risks (Vukina and Leegomonchai, 2006). 
Houses require a significant investment that is quite specific to broiler production (the cost of 
modern two-house facility can easily exceed $300,000). In addition, contracts provide very 
limited guarantees for growers: most specify a very limited term of coverage (a single flock is 
most common), and most do not include a quantity commitment on the part of the integrator.    4 
The lack of alternatives in broiler production has led to producer complaints about 
production contracts, and to legislative and regulatory proposals to regulate contracts.  For 
example, Title X (S. 2302) of the Senate version of the 2007 Farm Bill (the Food and Energy 
Security Act of 2007) expanded protections under the Agricultural Fair Practices Act to 
livestock associations and farmers who use production contracts.  Recently legislation 
(Competitive and Fair Agricultural Markets Act of 2007) was introduced in Congress to, among 
other things, prohibit unfair or deceptive agricultural commerce acts or practices regarding 
agricultural production and marketing contracts and set forth agricultural and production contract 
and enforcement provisions.  In addition, GIPSA has recently proposed a rule (Poultry Contracts; 
Initiation, Performance, and Termination, 9 CFR Part 201, at 
http://archive.gipsa.usda.gov/rulemaking/fr07/8-1-07.pdf) to require poultry companies to deliver 
a copy of an offered contract to growers; to include information about any Performance 
Improvement Plans in contracts, to include provisions for written termination notices in 
contracts, and allow growers to discuss contracts terms with designated individuals. 
This paper provides an initial exploration of the links between the local concentration of 
broiler integrators and grower compensation under production contracts using data from the 2006 
broiler version of USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey.   Our basic approach is 
to estimate how the number of locally available integrators influenced the fees that grower’s 
received.  The analysis attempts to control for factors that could affect grower compensation.  In 
particular, differences in the technology used on broiler operations will likely affect their relative 
performance, and so affect compensation. There also appear to be important differences in 
contract features across growers; some features affect production costs directly, while others 
assign responsibility for expenses, for assets, or for valuable byproducts to integrators, growers,   5 
or third parties. These features are likely to generate offsetting variations in the fees paid to 
growers under contracts. We expect that these contract features may themselves reflect elements 
of integrator competition, and these features are also included in the analysis.   
The current analysis should be considered a preliminary exploration.  In the final section, 
we discuss some of the limitations of the current approach, and some future possible model 
extensions.  
 
Survey Data on Broiler Production Operations 
Our data are drawn from a large-scale representative survey of broiler producers 
conducted early in 2007. The survey is part of the Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS), an annual survey of US farms that is the US Department of Agriculture’s primary 
source of information on the financial conditions of farm businesses and farm households, and 
the production practices of farms. In any given year, several versions of ARMS are distributed; 
two versions focus on all types of farms, while others focus on producers of specific 
commodities. A broiler version was included, for the first time, in an ARMS that was conducted 
early in 2007, with a focus on performance during 2006.
1  
The 2006 broiler version focused on commercial producers of broilers grown for meat--
excluding operations who raise broilers for show or for private consumption, as well as  egg-
laying, hatchery, and broiler breeder operations. To meet that goal, a sample was drawn from a 
target population consisting of all operations that produced broilers for meat and that had at least 
1,000 broilers on-site at any time during 2006. In order to efficiently conduct the survey, 
                                                 
1 Further information about ARMS, including downloadable copies of the questionnaires used, can be found at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ARMS/. Standard ARMS nomenclature refers to the survey by its reference year; 
thus the survey conducted in 2007, that gathers data on operations during 2006, is referred to as the 2006 ARMS. 
   6 
standard practice in  commodity-specific ARMS versions was followed, and the sample was 
limited to major production states--in this case, 17 states that accounted for 94 percent of US 
broiler production in the 2002 Census of Agriculture.
2  
In order to obtain more reliable estimates, some types of farms have a higher probability 
of sample selection. For example, larger operations are more likely to be selected for inclusion 
than smaller, and selection probabilities also vary across geographic areas. Each sample farm 
then represents a number of other farms from a similar geographic location and size class. In the 
broiler version, weights (the number of farms that each sample point represents) range from 3 to 
40 operations. When sample observations are weighted to reflect selection probabilities, 
population estimates for production and other industry characteristics can be generated. 
Out of 2,100 operations in the target sample for the broiler version, 1,602 useable survey 
responses were received. But 34 of the respondents, while they were still in farming, did not 
produce broilers for meat during 2006, leaving 1,568 broiler producers for analysis (a 75 percent 
response rate). Once the weights are recalibrated for nonresponse, the sample of useable 
responses represents 17,440 producers, and production of 8.4 billion broilers in 2006 (table 1). 
Our analysis focuses on 1,546 respondents who reported having a production contract for 
broilers—the other 22 were independents, processor-owned, or didn’t respond to the question. 
Three of those with production contracts reported no broiler removals in 2006, so we exclude 
them from our later analysis. Farms with production contracts accounted for 98.5 percent of 
broilers produced in the 17-state sample for 2006 (table 1). 
                                                 
2  The states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. We focus on 
commercial growers of broilers raised for meat so as to have a large sample of like operations for analysis. 
   7 
There’s a wide range of farm sizes in the industry, with some operations reporting as 
many as 18 broiler houses. But sixty percent of broiler operations had 1-4 houses in 2006, and 
they accounted for just under one-half of production, as measured by birds or by liveweight 
pounds (table 2). While production has been shifting to larger operations, very large operations, 
with 10 or more houses, still represent a small share of the industry—2.8 percent of production 
contract operations and about 10 percent of production.
3 
 
Concentration in Local Markets for Growers 
  Our concentration measures are grower-reported: that is, survey respondents were asked 
for the number of broiler companies that were active in their area. By this measure, local markets 
tend to be highly concentrated. Monopsony (a single integrator in the grower’s area) accounts for 
almost one quarter of operations (table 3), while another 28.7 percent report having two 
integrators, and 21.7 percent report having three. The highest number of companies reported is 
nine, and just over one fifth of operations report four or more in their area.
4 Operations who 
report having many companies in their area tend to be somewhat smaller and older than those 
reporting 1-3 companies. 
  Structural monopsony doesn’t necessarily imply the exercise of monopsony power, in the 
form of lower fees paid to growers. In a market for grower services, the alternatives open to 
current and potential growers may also include other types of farm production as well as off-
                                                 
3 Half of broiler production came from farms with at least 605,000 broilers removed (equivalent to 5 houses), and 
half came from smaller operations. Hoppe et al (2007) show that this midpoint farm size was 300,000 broilers in 
1987, and has been increasing since then. Nevertheless, the rate of increase is much less than in other commodity 
sectors, and the midpoint farm is still relatively small (600,000 broilers, at the average bird size, generates total 
grower revenues of just over $120,000 in a year).  
 
4 These estimates are consistent with those reported in Vukina and Leegomonchai (2006), for a 1999 survey of 
growers in 10 states. In that survey, 28 percent of growers reported a single integrator in their area, and the mean 
response was 2.48, compared to a mean response of 2.65 across the operations in this survey.   8 
farm employment, so even a monopsony integrator in an area may not have the ability to impose 
lower fees on growers.  
  Nevertheless, growers in monopsony locations do appear to receive slightly lower 
payments, on average, than do growers in areas with more integrators (table 3). Growers with a 
single broiler company in the area received average fees of 4.82 cents per pound of broilers 
(liveweight) removed, about 6 percent less than the 5.14 cents received by growers in regions 
with four or more companies. Growers who report two or three broiler companies receive 
average fees of just over 5 cents per pound. 
  The survey provides us with two ways to calculate average fees. Respondents report their 
total fees received from broiler production during 2006, as well as the total number of birds 
removed and their average weight. That allows us to calculate a “unit value” fee per pound, 
which is what’s reported in table 3 and in most of the paper. The survey also asks respondents 
directly for their average fee per pound. We expect that the latter might be more subject to error 
since growers deliver multiple flocks during the year, and the fees that a grower receives will 
usually vary across flocks. The two measures provide almost exactly the same average values (5 
cents a pound for each median, and the overall means differ by 0.002 cents), and they are 
strongly correlated with one another (a correlation coefficient of .90). Our models provide a 
modestly better fit for the unit values than for the average fees, although the effect of 
competition is slightly stronger for average fees. 
 
Technology, Contract Terms, and Fees 
  Other factors may affect the fees received by growers. Growers typically receive a base 
payment, but their total compensation also depends on their relative performance. That is, when 
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a flock is delivered, growers are placed in a pool with other growers delivering flocks in the 
same period, and those who realize lower chick mortality and lower feed conversion rates realize 
greater payments. As a result, payments would vary with those features of the farm’s technology 
that encourage greater efficiency. 
Base payments may also vary across growers, and growers may receive additional lump-sum 
annual payments. Our data suggest that contract features vary noticeably across growers and 
regions. Some features may impose higher costs on growers, which may be compensated with 
higher base payments. Other features may assign more expenses to integrators, which may lead 
to lower contract fees paid, while others assign valuable litter byproducts to integrators, growers, 
or third parties, with consequent impacts on fees. 
  Table 4, which reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis, also 
provides useful summaries of the technological features of broiler operations and the terms of 
trade observed in production contracts. With regard to technology, the survey asked questions 
about the operation’s broiler housing. Newer houses tend to be larger, and to have climate 
controls that allow for greater capacity utilization and greater efficiency. The average age of an 
operation’s housing stock is 17.9 years, with a wide variation across operations. Just over 70 
percent of housing capacity was fitted with tunnel ventilation, which allows for better climate 
control in houses.
5 A few operations (1.8 percent) had contracts for organic broilers--while 
integrators usually bear feed costs, organic production may impose higher costs on growers too.  
  While integrators provide feed and veterinary services under most production contracts, 
they may also pay for other expenses, and these features ought to affect base payments. For 
                                                 
5  Operations usually had tunnel ventilation in all or none of their houses, so the 71.2 percent estimate is also a good 
estimate of the proportion of operations with the technology. The survey also gathered information on housing 
construction (solid walls or curtains) and other technology, such as evaporative cooling. These tended to be strongly 
correlated with tunnel ventilation.   10 
example, growers usually finance their own houses, but integrators own houses on about 2.3 
percent of production contract operations. In nearly one-quarter of contracts, the integrator pays 
for at least part of the grower’s fuel or litter expenses, while the integrator bears custom work 
expenses, for catching or clean-out, in nearly half of contracts. 
  With regard to contract features, just over one-half of operations had a HACCP food 
safety plan required in the contract, while just under half reported that there were no antibiotics 
in the feed that they provided to their birds. A HAACP plan likely imposes higher costs on 
growers, while doing without antibiotics may lead to higher mortality and poorer feed 
conversion. Some contracts (12.7 percent) tie fees to indexes of broiler market prices, while most 
(56.2 percent) adjust fees seasonally for changes in fuel prices. A few (5.2 percent) have tying 
features, in that they specify a dealer for contractor fuel purchases. 
 
Statistical Inference with ARMS Survey Data 
  We want to explore how grower compensation varies with features of technology, 
contracts, and integrator concentration. We begin with several linear regressions, and in each one 
a measure of contract fees is the dependent variable (we use the unit value fee per pound, the log 
of that measure, and the log of total annual compensation).  The set of explanatory variables 
includes the measures of contract features, technology, and operation characteristics reported in 
table 4, as well as the binary competition measures in table 3. 
  ARMS data are derived from a complex survey design which includes stratification, 
clustering, dual frames, and unequal probability sampling, and the general consensus among 
statisticians is that analytical inference needs to account for the design (National Research 
Council, 2008; Deaton, 1997). There is less consensus as to how to do this.    11 
  Most ARMS regression analyses derive weighted least squares parameter estimates using 
the provided sampling weights, and then estimate the variability of parameter estimates under the 
sampling distribution. The variance estimation is typically performed using a delete-a-group 
jackknife procedure, which can be accomplished using a set of 15 replicate weights provided by 
USDA with the research database. Unfortunately, degrees of freedom in the variance estimator 
are directly related to the number of replicate weights, which at 15 greatly limit the use of 
models that are either complex or that include substantial numbers of parameters. Since it 
appears that contract features vary among producers, that they affect fees, and that there may be 
several relevant features, this feature of the jackknife approach limits our ability to develop 
inference tests for individual parameters. 
  We’ve taken three approaches to the issue. First, we care about the magnitude of the  
point estimates of the parameters, and we take some time to talk about them, and to argue that 
they are substantively important. Second, where the features of contracts and technology are 
concerned, we are not particularly concerned about statistical significance for individual 
parameters, although we do care whether groups of variables have statistically significant effects 
on fees. In those cases, we report a series of F-tests on relevant groups of parameters (table 6). 
Third, we do care about tests of inference on the individual competition parameters in our model. 
We ran an initial regression without the competition variables, and in a second regression ran the 
residuals against the three competition variables. In the second regression, we could estimate 
error variances for the competition variables using the delete a group jackknife with three 
parameters. In table 6, jackknife standard errors are reported in bold for the integrator 
competition variables. 
     12 
Statistical Analyses of Contract Fees 
In our regression analyses, we dropped some observations with extreme values of the 
dependent variable, while others had to be deleted because they had missing values for some 
variables. Specifically, we dropped any observation with reported fees (in unit values) of less 
than 2.5 cents or more than 20 cents per pound, on the grounds that fee revenues, broiler 
removals, or accounts receivable were likely misreported. In total, 37 of the 1543 observations 
were dropped for this reason. In addition, 46 respondents did not provide data on housing 
characteristics, leaving us with 1,460 observations for analyses of the links among technologies, 
contract features, competition, and fees. 
  We analyzed several exploratory regressions aimed at explaining variations in fees (per 
pound) received by growers. All observations were weighted to reflect their sampling 
probabilities. We analyzed variations in fees per pounds, in the logarithm of fees per pound, and 
in the log of total fees (while controlling for total output). Results are reported in tables 5 and 6. 
In evaluating the results, it’s important to bear in mind the range of fee payments received by 
growers. The mean fee was 5.04 cents per pound, while 90 percent of the observations fell in a 
range of 2.3 cents, from 3.89 to 6.19 cents per pound. Several patterns stand out. 
·  The characteristics of the broiler operation matter, in an economically substantive 
way. Operations producing larger birds realize greater fees per bird, but lower fees 
per pound. On average, a one pound increase in the size of the bird is associated with 
a 0.12-0.16 cent decline in fees per pound (bird sizes range widely in the data, from 3 
to 9 pounds). Organic operations receive about a penny per pound more than those 
producing conventional birds. There’s some evidence that those who apply litter to   13 
their own fields, and hence place a higher value on the litter byproduct, receive lower 
contract fees, although the effects are small and marginally significant. 
·  Housing characteristics affect fees received in statistically significant and 
economically meaningful ways. An F test for the joint significance of the set of four 
housing variables, when added to a regression with only operation characteristics, 
yields a test statistic of 37.7 (table 6). Operations with tunnel ventilation realize 
higher fees—about 0.45 cents per pound, or a nine percent increase, on average.
6 
Given tunnel ventilation, older houses realize lower fees; a farm with 20 year old 
houses realize fees that are about 0.4 cents, or 8 percent, below a farm with new 
houses. Those in which the integrator owns the house realize fees that are half a cent 
lower. 
·  Terms of trade (contract features) matter, in economically meaningful and sensible 
ways. We included nine features of contracts in the model, all specified as 0-1 
dummy variables, and they were highly significant in a joint F test for inclusion (table 
6). Among the more important effects, operations with long term contracts (5 years or 
more) received fees that were about 0.18 cents, or 4 percent, higher than others. 
Operations who reported that there were no antibiotics in their feed received fees that 
were 0.15 cents higher, while those whose fees were adjusted for changes in fuel 
prices received 0.1 cents more per pound in 2006. Operations whose contracts tied 
them to specific energy dealers received noticeably higher fees (0.34 cents per 
pound), and those whose litter or fuel expenses were paid for by the integrator 
received lower contract fees (0.19 cents per pound). Those whose custom work   14 
expenses were paid for by the integrator received noticeably higher fees (0.15 cents 
per pound), perhaps because custom work involved litter cleanout, and transfer of the 
litter to the integrator or a third party. 
·  Competition, as measured by the number of integrators in a local area, matters, 
although the effects are not very large. Compared to areas with 4 or more integrators, 
growers in areas with a single integrator receive fees that are 0.33 cents per pound 
lower (about 6.6 percent). Growers who face two or three integrators receive fees that 
are 2.6-4.0 percent lower than those with 4 or more competitors.
7 What’s striking 
about these estimates is that they are little changed from the comparison of simple 
means. While measures of housing, contract, and operations characteristics improve 
the fits of the equations, and these measures appear to affect fees paid, their inclusion 




We draw three conclusions from our initial exploration of the data. Local markets for 
grower services are highly concentrated. There appears to be small but economically meaningful 
effects of concentration on grower compensation. But compensation is also affected by contract 
features, and they vary considerably across growers.  
We’ve characterized this research as exploratory. What’s left out? First, within the 
context of the modeling approach we’ve taken, concentration is assumed to be exogenous. It may 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Better climate control raises grower costs, but should raise fees because they increase feed efficiency and reduce 
mortality. When all growers in an area adopt improved controls, they no longer realize a relative advantage over 
other growers, and added compensation would have to go into the base pay. 
7 These findings are consistent with other studies of concentration and price (Weiss, 1989; MacDonald, Handy, and 
Plato, 2002). It’s not uncommon to find that concentration has a statistically significant association with price, that is 
nevertheless rather small in comparison to the predicted effects of pure monopoly or monopsony, nor is it 
uncommon to find that the effects vary with the number of players, within markets that are quite concentrated.    15 
not be. Suppose some local areas have substantial alternative options for growers, such that 
integrators of all types must pay more to attract them. In those areas, integrator costs will be 
higher and presuming that they sell in a national market, integrator profits will be less. Some 
integrator may exit, raising concentration. In short, the error term may be inversely associated 
with concentration. If this matters, we may need to think about developing an instrument for 
concentration. 
Second, we haven’t developed a comprehensive model of the local market for grower 
services, in which we would account for grower alternatives and, ideally, identify a grower 
supply function and estimate the degree to which concentration might allow for the suppression 
of grower returns. 
Third, contract features are not themselves exogenous. For example, we note (in table 4) 
that few growers have long term contracts. We also note (in table 5) that those who do have long 
term contracts get higher compensation, even after accounting for the technology used on the 
operation. But long-term contracts are not offered randomly. They are far more likely to be 
offered to new operations that are also large operations (MacDonald 2008). While there may be 
efficiency-based explanations for this pattern, it could also reflect price discrimination in the 
market for growers--higher prices offered to (marginal) entrants, and lower prices offered to 
inframarginal existing producers. In input markets for livestock, terms of trade vary widely and 
matter for analyzing prices. It may be that “terms of trade” also vary widely in markets for 
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Table 1. Broiler Production in 2006, by Type of Operation 
 
  All Farms  Farms reporting broiler removals 
Type of Operation  Obs.  Farms  Obs.  Farms  Removals 
Production Contract  1,546  17,200  1,543  17,183  8,310,308,738 
Processor-Owned  12  163  12  163  84,166,446 
Independent  6  52  6  52  31,411,423 
More than One Type  2  14  2  14   8,219,932 
Refusal/Don’t Know  2  11  2  11   5,265,540 
All Operations  1,568  17,440  1,565  17,423  8,439,372,079 
Note: The number of observations is columns labeled “Obs.”, while columns labeled “farms” 
and “removals” report weighted population estimates. Note that 3 sample farms, who reported 
that they had production contracts, failed to report the number of birds removed. 
Source: 2006 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, version 4.    19 










  -Percent of column total- 
nr  0.5  0.2  0.2  0 
1-2  27.3  11.6  10.7  11.0 
3-4  43.1  38.0  37.4  38.0 
5-6  18.7  25.4  26.0  25.0 
7-8  6.1  10.9  11.3  11.8 
9-10  1.7  4.2  4.2  4.2 
11-12  1.2  3.4  3.6  3.5 
13-18  1.6  6.4  6.7  6.6 
All Farms  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
         
Total  17,183  8,310 million  44,815 million  1,221 million 
Note: Observations are weighted by inverse sampling probabilities to yield population estimates. 
Source: 2006 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, version 4, production contracts only. 
The row labeled “nr” includes operations that refused to provide information on houses, or that 
reported that they had no houses. 
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Table 3: Concentration in Broiler Grow-out 
 
Number of Integrators in Grower’s Area   
Item  1  2  3  4 or more 
Share of all:         
  Broiler Operations  24.5  28.7  21.7  25.1 
  Birds Removed  24.7  29.8  22.7  22.7 
         
Mean:         
  Number of houses  4.2  4.3  4.2  3.9 
  Age of houses (years)  17.7  17.5  18.4  18.5 
  Fees received (cents/lb)  4.82  5.05  5.03  5.14 
Note: Producers were asked for the number of broiler companies in their area. 
Observations are weighted by inverse sampling probabilities to yield population estimates. 
Source: 2006 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, version 4, production contracts only.  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Variable description  Units  Mean  S.D. 
Fees from broiler production  dollars  133,141  343,968 
Total pounds removed (liveweight)  pounds  2,669,094  6,736,339 
Fees per pound   cents  5.04  3.50 
Average broiler weight   pounds  5.57  4.85 
Capacity utilization (pounds removed)  lbs/sq ft  36.69  44.88 
Age of housing stock  Years  17.9  29.3 
Share of capacity with  tunnel ventilation  0-100%  .712  1.455 
Share of capacity owned by integrator  0-100%  .023  0.364 
Share of litter spread on fields  0-100%  .402  1.419 
Organic operation  0-1  .018   
Flock to flock contract  0-1  .444   
Contract of 5 years or more  0-1  .136   
HACCP plan required  0-1  .545   
No antibiotics in feed  0-1  .429   
Contractor reimburses litter or fuel  0-1  .236   
Contractor reimburses custom work  0-1  .456   
Fees depend on market prices for broilers  0-1   .127   
Fees adjusted seasonally for fuel prices  0-1  .562   
Fees tied to fuel purchase  0-1  .052   
Note: Observations are weighted by inverse sampling probabilities to yield population estimates. 
Source: 2006 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, version 4, production contracts only.    22 
Table 5: Effects of Integrator Concentration and Contract Terms on Contract Fees 
 
  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors 
Dependent variable  Fee/lb  Fee/lb  ln (fee/lb)  Ln (fees) 








Operation characteristics         
Number of birds removed (log)        0.9680 
(0.0082) 
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  HACCP plan required    0.0598  0.0132  0.0137   23 
(0.0557)  (0.0103)  (0.0103) 


















Observations  1506  1460  1460  1460 
R
2  0.06  0.15  0.17  0.94 
Note. Bold-faced standard errors are jackknife estimates, from secondary regression described in 
text, page 12. 




Table 6: Tests of significance for adding variable clusters to pricing model 
 
Model  Description  Critical value  F statistic 
1  Operation variables only  3.88  21.32 
2  Adding housing variables to (1)  3.40  37.70 
3  Adding contract terms to (2)  2.52  8.48 
4  Adding competition terms to (3)  3.88  7.87 
Note: Variables are identified in table 5. Critical values are for the upper 1% of the F 
distribution. 
Source: 2006 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, version 4, production contracts only.  
 